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Abstract
In this paper we model U.S. labor supply and demand over the next 25 years. Despite the anticipated
aging of the population, moderate population growth will provide growing supplies of labor well into the
21st century. Improvements in labor quality due to greater education and experience will also continue for
some time, but will eventually disappear. Productivity growth for the U.S. economy will be below long-term
historical averages, but labor-using technical change will be a stimulus to the growth of labor demand. Year-
to-year changes in economic activity will be primarily the consequence of capital accumulation. However,
the driving forces of economic growth over the long term will be demography and technology.
© 2008 Society for Policy Modeling. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In this paper, we model U.S. labor supply and demand in considerable detail in order to
capture the enormous heterogeneity of the labor force and its evolution over the next 25 years.
We represent labor supplies for a large number of demographic groups as responses to prices
of leisure and consumption of goods and services. The price of leisure is an after-tax wage rate,
while the prices of goods and services reflect the supply prices of the industries that produce them.
By including demographic characteristics among the determinants of household preferences, we
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incorporate the expected demographic transition into our long-run projections of the U.S. labor
market.
The U.S. population will be growing older and elderly households have very different patterns
of labor supply and consumption. Our projections thus incorporate the expected fall in the supply
of labor per capita. These changes in labor supply patterns are the consequence of population
aging, rather than wage and income effects. Despite the anticipated aging of the U.S. population,
moderate population growth will provide growing supplies of labor well into the 21st century.
Improvements in the quality of U.S. labor input, defined as increased average levels of educational
attainment and experience, will also continue for some time, but will gradually disappear over
the next quarter century.
We represent labor demand for each of 35 industrial sectors of the U.S. economy as a response
to the prices of productive inputs: labor, capital, and intermediate goods and services. In addition,
labor demand is driven by changes in technology. Technical change generates productivity growth
within each industry. Rates of productivity growth differ widely among industries, ranging from
the blistering pace of advance in computers and electronic components to the gradual decline in
construction and petroleum refining. In addition, changes in technology may be biased. Labor-
saving technical change reduces demand for labor for given input prices, while labor-using change
increases labor demand.
Productivity growth for the U.S. economy as a whole will be below long-term historical
averages. However, productivity growth in information technology equipment and software will
continue to outpace productivity growth in the rest of the economy. The output of the U.S. economy
will continue to shift toward industries with high rates of productivity growth. Labor input biases
of technical change are substantial in many industries. Labor-using, rather than labor-saving,
biases predominate. Labor-using technical change will continue to be a stimulus to the growth of
labor demand and differences in the biases for different industries will play an important role in
the reallocation of labor.
We incorporate the determinants of long-term labor supply and demand into a model of U.S.
economic growth. We refer to this model as IGEM1 for Inter-temporal General Equilibrium
Model. Markets for labor, capital, and the output of the economy equilibrate through the price
system at each point of time. In the labor market, for example, wage rates determine the labor
supplied by the current population and the labor demanded by employers in the many sectors of
the economy. In the model and the U.S. economy year-to-year changes in the level of economic
activity are primarily the consequence of the accumulation of capital. However, over a quarter
century the driving forces of economic growth are demography and technology—as encapsulated
in the neo-classical theory of economic growth.
In IGEM, capital formation is determined by the equilibration of saving and investment. We
model household saving at the level of the individual household. Consumption, labor supply, and
saving for each household are chosen to maximize a utility function, defined on the stream of future
consumption of goods and leisure, subject to an inter-temporal budget constraint. The forward-
looking character of savings decisions allows changes in future prices and rates of return to affect
current labor supply. The availability of capital input in the U.S. economy is the consequence of
past investment. This backward-looking feature of capital accumulation links current markets of
capital input to past investment decisions.
1 Detailed information about earlier versions of IGEM and a survey of applications are available in Jorgenson (1998).
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Table 1
Personal consumption expenditures and leisure, IGEM categories, 2000
IGEM categories $Bil Category
1 Food 568.6 3
2 Meals 376.5 4
3 Meals-employees 9.9 5, 6
4 Shoes 46.3 12
5 Clothing 267.4 14–16
6 Gasoline 164.4 75
7 Coal 0.2 40
8 Fuel oil 17.9 40
9 Tobacco 72.2 7
10 Cleaning supplies 115.8 21, 34
11 Furnishings 38.3 33
12 Drugs 156.3 45
13 Toys 62.7 89
14 Stationery 23.4 35
15 Imports (travel) 3.3 111
16 Reading 51.7 88, 95
17 Rental 247.4 25, 27
18 Electricity 101.5 37
19 Gas 40.8 38
20 Water 48.8 39
21 Communications 130.6 41
22 Domestic service 16.0 42
23 Other household 48.5 43
24 Own transportation 210.8 74, 76, 77
25 Transportation 56.9 79, 80, 82–85
26 Medical services 921.3 47–49, 51, 55
27 Health Insurance 70.6 56
28 Personal services 76.2 17, 19, 22
29 Financial services 517.7 61–64
30 Other services 114.8 65–67
31 Recreation 255.5 94, 97–103
32 Education and welfare 354.1 105–108
33 Foreign travel 80.9 110
34 Owner maintenance 90.0 Our imputation
35 Durables flow 1394.4 Our imputation
Leisure 13786.3 Our imputation
Note: NIPA-PCE category refers to the line number in Table 2.4 of SBC 2002.
2. A long-run model of the U.S. economy and the labor market
Our household model generates demands for a detailed list of personal consumption expen-
ditures given in Table 1. Household preferences are structured in a nested, or tiered, manner. At
the top tier utility is a function of non-durables, capital services, consumer services, and leisure.
Lower tiers allocate non-durables to specific goods, like food and clothing, and consumer ser-
vices to transportation, finance and other services. Household consumption patterns for goods
and leisure are derived from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX).2 The items in Table 1 are
2 See http://www.bls.gov/cex/home.htm. Detailed documentation for the CEX is available at: http://www.bls.gov/
cex/home.htm#publications.
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Table 2
Industry output and value added, 2000
Code Industry name Output Value-added SIC
1 Agriculture 388,994 195,781 01–02, 07–09
2 Metal mining 15,603 7,167 10
3 Coal mining 23,081 14,175 11–12
4 Petroleum and gas 136,651 72,669 13
5 Non-metallic mining 18,894 10,619 14
6 Construction 995,279 419,200 15–17
7 Food products 487,587 156,127 20
8 Tobacco 35,853 10,108 21
9 Textile mill products 61,629 21,811 22
10 Apparel and textiles 84,273 32,899 23
11 Lumber and wood 115,974 43,305 24
12 Furniture and fixtures 87,965 39,619 25
13 Paper products 175,955 72,942 26
14 Printing and publishing 233,523 137,723 27
15 Chemicals products 422,655 183,438 28
16 Petroleum refining 235,145 26,422 29
17 Rubber and plastic 170,270 77,459 30
18 Leather products 10,616 4,028 31
19 Stone, clay and glass 111,040 53,522 32
20 Primary metals 190,627 59,691 33
21 Fabricated metal 279,540 125,540 34
22 Industrial machinery and equipment 472,251 193,646 35
23 Electronic and electric equipment 433,257 195,913 36
24 Motor vehicles 427,709 83,072 371
25 Other transportation equipment 186,241 87,121 372–379
26 Instruments 183,293 104,351 38
27 Miscellaneous manufacturing 52,715 21,889 39
28 Transport and warehouse 553,535 263,335 40–47
29 Communications 430,330 231,027 48
30 Electric utilities 245,950 166,618 491, %493
31 Gas utilities 81,196 26,421 492, %493, 496
32 Trade 1,965,715 1,187,180 50–59
33 FIRE 2,009,429 1,240,039 60–67
34 Services 3,455,269 2,197,343 70–87, 494–495
35 Government enterprises 256,268 167,722
36 Private households 1,394,410 1,394,410 88
37 General government 1,194,160 1,194,160
based on the consumption categories in the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPAs).3
They are linked to the supplying industries listed in Table 2.
As the owner of the economy’s wealth, the household sector makes a second contribution to
the demand side of the economy through the demand for investment goods. The savings by the
household sector are allocated between domestic and foreign investment and the domestic portion
is distributed among investments in assets such as structures, equipment, consumer durables
and inventories. Capital stocks and capital services are derived primarily from the Fixed Asset
3 See http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm. Detailed documentation for the NIPAs is available at: http://www.bea.gov/
methodologies/index.htm.
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Accounts of the Bureau of Economic Analysis,4 which include information on investment by
60 asset categories. Data on labor input by industry are derived from detailed demographic and
wage data in the annual Current Population Surveys and the decennial Censuses of Population,
as described by Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2005).
We separate the production sector in IGEM into 35 individual industries. The complete list is
given in Table 2, together with the value of each industry’s output in 2000 and the corresponding
Standard Industrial Classification codes. Each industry produces output from labor, capital, and
intermediate inputs, using a technology that allows for substitution among these inputs. Although
technology can be represented by means of a production function, we find it much more convenient
to use a dual approach, based on a price function that gives the price of output of each sector
as a function of the prices of inputs. Technologies are structured in a nested or tiered manner
with intermediate inputs divided between energy and materials; both energy and materials are
further sub-divided among inputs that correspond to the 35 commodity groups produced by the
35 industries.
Our representation of the technology in each sector includes the rate and biases of technical
change. The rate of technical change captures improvements in productivity or growth in output
per unit of input. The biases of technical change correspond to increases or decreases in the
shares of inputs in the value of output, holding input prices constant. The evolution of patterns
of production reflects both price-induced substitution among inputs and the impact of changes in
technology. We project the historical patterns of technical change represented in our database in
order to incorporate future changes in technology into the demand for inputs of labor, capital, and
intermediate goods and services.
The production of each commodity by one or more of the 35 U.S. domestic industries is
augmented by imports of that commodity from the rest of the world to generate the U.S. domestic
supply. This supply is allocated to U.S. industries as an intermediate input and to final demand for
consumption by U.S. households and governments, investments by U.S. businesses, households,
and governments, and net exports. Since imports are not perfect substitutes for commodities
produced domestically, we also model the substitution between imports and domestic production
explicitly. The rest of the world absorbs exports from the U.S. and the net flow of resources in
each period is governed by an exogenously specified current account deficit.
The final sector explicitly considered in our model is the government sector, which taxes,
spends, and makes transfer payments. Public consumption is one component of final demand,
while public borrowing is one of the uses of private saving. The flow of goods and factors among
the four sectors of the U.S. economy – business, household, government and the rest of the world
– is illustrated in Fig. 1. Prices adjust to equate the supply from domestic and foreign producers
to the demand from households, investors, government, and exports in each period.
Our model of the U.S. economy is implemented econometrically. Parameters describing the
behavior of producers and consumers are estimated statistically from a data set that we have
constructed specifically for this purpose. These data are based on a new system of national
accounts that integrates the wealth accounts with the National Income and Product Accounts
(NIPAs).5 The capital accounts include investment goods, capital services, capital stocks, and the
corresponding prices. These data are described in detail by Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2005).
4 See http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#fixed. Detailed documentation for the Fixed Assets Accounts is available
at: http://www.bea.gov/methodologies/index.htm.
5 See Jorgenson and Landefeld (2006).
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Fig. 1. Flow of goods and factors in IGEM.
Similar data have recently been released for members of the European Union by the EU KLEMS
project.6
3. Exogenous variables in the projections
Our model of the U.S. economy simulates the future growth and structure of the economy over
the intermediate term of 25 years. The time path of model outcomes is conditional on projections
of exogenous variables. Among the most important of these variables are the total population,
the time endowment of the working-age population, the overall government deficit, the current
account deficit, world prices and government tax policies. Many of these are developed from
published sources, “official” and otherwise. In addition, we project the evolution of technology
in each of the 35 industries that make up the production sector of the model. These variables are
projected from the historical data set that underlies the production model and its estimation.
The key exogenous variables that describe the growth and composition of the U.S. population
are population projections by sex and individual year of age from the U.S. Bureau of the Census.7
During the sample period the population is allocated to educational attainment categories using
data from the Current Population Survey8 in a way that is parallel to our calculation of labor
6 See http://www.euklems.net/. This data set was released on 15 March 2007, and is described in “Use IT or Lose It,”
The Economist, May 19–25, 2007, p. 82.
7 See: http://www.census.gov/popest/estimates.php. Historical data are taken from: http://www.census.gov/
popest/archives/. These population data are revised to match the latest censuses (e.g., 1981 data is revised to be consistent
with the 1990 Census).
8 See http://www.census.gov/cps/.
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Fig. 2. Sources of growth.
input. Each adult is given a time endowment of 14 h a day to be used for work and leisure. The
number of hours for each sex–age–education category is weighted by labor compensation rates
and aggregated to form the national time endowment presented in Fig. 2.
Our projections use Census Bureau forecasts by sex and age. We assume that the educational
attainment of those aged 35 or younger will be the same as in the last year of the sample period;
that is, a person who becomes 22 years old in 2014 will have the same chance of having a BA
degree as a person in 2004. Those aged 55 and over carry their education attainment with them
as they age; that is, the educational distribution of 70 year olds in 2014 is the same as that of
60 year olds in 2004. Those between 35 and 55 have a complex adjustment that is a mixture of
these two assumptions to allow a smooth improvement of educational attainment that is consistent
with the observed profile in 2004. The result of these calculations, shown in Fig. 2, is that the
U.S. population is expected to grow at just under 1% per year through 2030, reaching a level in
excess of 365 million. The gradually slowing improvement in the average level of educational
attainment implies that the time endowment grows at a modestly faster rate of around 1% through
2030.
Fig. 3. Labor participation and real wages.
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Fig. 4. Population and household time endowment.
We project productivity growth for each of the 35 industries, using the state-space approach
of Jin and Jorgenson (2007). To illustrate this approach, Fig. 3 gives historical data for the period
1960–2004, based on the estimates of Jorgenson, Ho, Samuels, and Stiroh (2007). These data
update and revise the estimates of Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2005). Fig. 4 presents projections
of productivity growth for the period 2004–2030, using the state-space approach. Positive pro-
ductivity growth reduces output prices, relative to costs of inputs, while negative growth raises
output prices relative to costs.
For 2004–2030 our baseline projections reveal steadily improving productivity in 30 of the
35 sectors in IGEM. Electrical Machinery, which contains electronic components such as the
semiconductor devices used in computers and telecommunications equipment, leads the list in
projected productivity growth. Although the projected productivity growth rate exceeds 3%, this
represents a slight reduction in the rate of productivity growth of just under 4% for the historical
period 1960–2004. Non-electrical Machinery, including computers, has the second highest rate
of productivity growth in both the historical period and the projections, but the projected growth
rate is considerably lower than the historical rate.
We show below that the overall rates of productivity growth projected for the U.S. economy
are substantially below the historical period 1960–2004. It is also important to recognize losses
in productivity as well as gains at the industry level. There are several sectors with negative
projected productivity growth, including the very large construction industry and the relatively
small tobacco industry. Both industries also have declining productivity during the sample period
1960–2004.
Projections of the input biases are accomplished in a similar manner to projections of produc-
tivity. Fig. 5 gives historical data for the period 1960–2004, while Fig. 6 gives our projections
for the period 2004–2030. We recall that the definition of biased technical change is the effect of
changes in technology on the share of labor input in the value of industry output, holding prices
of labor input, as well as capital, energy, and materials inputs constant. It is important to keep in
mind that we have fitted and projected biases of technical change for capital, energy, and materials
inputs, as well as labor input, but these are not presented in this paper in order to economize on
space.
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Fig. 5. Growth in total factor productivity, 1960–2004.
Fig. 6. Growth in total factor productivity, 2004–2030.
During the sample period technical change is predominantly labor-using rather than labor-
saving. Metal mining, a relatively small industry, has a very large labor-using bias of technical
change, while coal mining has a large labor-saving bias. Biases of technical change differ substan-
tially among industries and both labor-using and labor-saving changes occur with some frequency.
It is important to project rates of technical change to determine the growth rate of individual
industries and the economy as a whole.
However, it is also important to project biases of technical change in order to capture the impact
of changes in technology on the distribution of labor input among sectors.
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Fig. 7. Labor input biases, 1960–2004.
Two other important assumptions that determine the shape of the economy are the government
and trade deficits. Our projection of the government deficit follows the forecasts of the Congres-
sional Budget Office for the next 10 years and then is set on course to a zero balance by 2030.9 The
current account deficit is assumed to shrink steadily, relative to the GDP, so that it also reaches
a sustainable balance by 2030. These simplifying assumptions allow the simulation the produce
a smooth time path. The government and current account deficits are determinants of long run
growth to the extent that they influence capital formation, but are substantially less important than
the exogenous demographic and technology variables we have described.
4. Projection of U.S. economic growth
Our baseline path for the economy generates a labor force participation rate, defined as the ratio
of labor input to the time endowment. We have used this to extrapolate the ratio of hours worked to
discretionary hours available from the working age population. The participation rate presented in
Fig. 7 reached a peak in 2000, before the shallow recession of 2001 and the “jobless” recovery that
followed. The historical data from 1960 to 1990 show substantial gains in participation. No such
gains in participation are in prospect for the next quarter century. At the same time, projections
beginning in 2004 do not suggest a large decline in labor force participation.
It is important to keep in mind that the rate of population growth will be declining throughout the
projection period 2004–2030. The working age population will be growing at a very similar rate
to the population as a whole during our projection period. During the historical period 1960–2004
the working age population grew considerably more rapidly than the population. Finally, the time
endowment, which adjusts the population for changes in composition by educational attainment
and experience, will continue to grow more rapidly than the working age population. However,
changes in composition will gradually disappear as average levels of education and experience
stabilize.
Real wages, defined as the ratio of the price of labor input to the price of consumption goods and
services, are also presented in Fig. 7. Contrary to historical trends often described in the business
9 See http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm.
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Fig. 8. Labor input biases, 2004–2030.
press, real wages have risen steadily throughout the post-war period with especially rapid growth
rates during the period 1995–2004. Our projections of real wages rise steadily during the period
2004–2030, but at a decreasing rate. This declining rate of increase mimics the historical data
from 1973–1995, prior to the U.S. growth resurgence. This began around 1995 and continued into
the period 2000–2004. The slowdown of the rate of growth of real wages will occur despite the
continuation of historical productivity trends summarized in Section 3.
We next turn to the sources of U.S. economic growth during the historical and projection
periods. Fig. 8 presents historical data on the sources of U.S. economic growth during 1960–2004
recently compiled by Jorgenson, Ho, Samuels, and Stiroh (2007). The overall rate of growth is an
impressive 3.34% per year. The most important source of growth is capital input, which contributes
1.70% or well over half of growth during the historical period. The next most important source
of growth is labor input, which contributes 0.95% per year. These contributions are the growth
rates of capital and labor inputs, each weighted by the corresponding share in the value of output.
Total factor productivity growth contributes 0.69% per year or slightly more than 20% of growth
during the historical period.
We project the growth of the U.S. economy during the period 2004–2030 to be only 1.61% per
year. The contribution of capital input will remain the most important source of growth at 0.74%
per year. The growth of total factor productivity will decline very slightly to 0.44% per year and
will outstrip the sharply lower contribution of labor input of 0.42%. While the contributions of
capital and labor inputs will still greatly predominate among the sources of U.S. economic growth,
the relative importance of total factor productivity growth will jump substantially. This reflects
the strength of the projected productivity trends described in Section 3.
We conclude our discussion of projected U.S. economic growth with a description of the
growth of output and labor input at the industry level. Fig. 9 presents growth rates of labor input
for each of the 35 industries in IGEM during the historical period 1960–2004. Slightly less than
half the industries experienced an increase in labor input, led by Personal and Business Services.
However, many industries experienced sharp declines in labor input, led by Leather and Leather
Products, Apparel and Textile Products, and Gas Utilities. The growth rate of labor input overall
was 1.64% per year.
We have projected a substantial slowdown in the growth rate of labor input for the period
2004–2030 to 0.70% per year. Fig. 10 provides a breakdown by industries.
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Fig. 9. Growth in labor input, 1960–2004.
Positive growth in labor input predominates in the projections. Relatively small sectors with
low projected productivity growth like Tobacco and Petroleum Refining will show substantial
increases in labor input. As widely anticipated, the large service sectors like Finance, Insurance,
and Real Estate, will greatly predominate in the growth of labor input. Primary Metals and
Metal Mining will continue to release labor input to a future U.S. economy that is increasingly
constrained by the slow growth of the labor supply.
Labor input biases are an important component of changes in demand for labor input. Labor-
using technical change results in an increase in the share of labor input, holding prices of labor,
Fig. 10. Growth in labor input, 2004–2030.
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Fig. 11. Growth of domestic output, 1960–2004.
capital, energy, and materials inputs constant. This predominates in our projections, as well as
in the sample period. The share of labor input in Instruments will increase by 0.06 during the
projection period 2004–2030, reversing a similar decline in the share of labor input during the
sample period 1960–2004. Metal mining, a small sector that had a large labor-using bias of
Fig. 12. Growth of domestic output, 2004–2030.
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technical change during the sample period, has a smaller labor-using bias during the projection
period. Biases of technical change are an important component of labor input demand, along with
the steady rise in the price of labor input relative to other inputs.
Growth in industry output completes our picture of future U.S. economic growth. Fig. 11
gives historical data on output growth for the period 1960–2004. Economic growth during the
period 1960–2004 differed widely among industries with a relatively narrow range of industries
exceeding the economy-wide average of 3.22%. As expected, the rapidly growing sectors were
led by Electrical Machinery, including electronic components. Substantial growth also took place
in Non-electrical Machinery, which contains computers, Communications, the largest consuming
sector for information technology equipment and software, and Instruments, another major con-
sumer. Only three industries experienced declining output growth—Leather and Leather Products,
Gas Utilities, and Tobacco Manufactures.
Fig. 12 gives U.S. economic growth during the projection period 2004–2030. Again, growth
rates will differ substantially among industries with Electrical Machinery exhibiting growth at the
very rapid pace of more than 6% per year, comparable to the historical period 1960–2004. Most
of the remaining industries, including Non-electrical Machinery, one of the stars of the historical
period, will scale back growth. The relatively small Leather industry will reverse the negative
growth of the historical period and exceed the economy-wide average of 1.50%.
5. Summary and conclusions
Our first and most important conclusion is that future supply and demand for labor in the U.S.
economy will be driven by demography and technology. The supply side of the labor market
will be dominated by the slowdown in the growth of the working age population, partly offset
by continuing increases in the quality of labor input due to rising average levels of educational
attainment and experience. From 1960 to 1990 the participation rate of the working age population
increased fairly steadily as more women joined men as participants in the labor market. No such
increases in labor force participation are in prospect for our projection period 2004–2030.
The widely discussed aging of the labor force is reflected in the slowing growth of the working
age population, relative to the total population. The working age population will continue to
expand more rapidly than the population as a whole and participation rates will decline very
slowly. However, the slowdown in the growth of the time endowment will reduce the growth rate
of the U.S. economy very substantially. This will be reinforced by the decline in investment and
growth of capital input than will accompany slow growth of labor supply. It is important to keep
in mind that in the neo-classical theory of economic growth embodied in IGEM, the growth of
capital input is endogenous and is equal to the growth of output in the long run.10
Finally, future growth of productivity will remains robust, despite waves of technological
pessimism that sometimes accompany cyclical downturns. Rapid changes in technology will
continue to be concentrated in the industries that produce information technology equipment
and software, led by Electrical Machinery, the industry that includes electronic components like
semiconductors. This industry has had very rapid growth of total factor productivity or output per
unit of unit, throughout the historical period 1960–2004. We project that this will continue for
the next quarter century although the specific form of the underlying changes in technology will
undergo the same dramatic evolution as in the recent past.
10 Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh (2007) have pointed out the implications of this fact for growth in an intermediate run of 10
years.
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At the level of individual industries the demand for labor depends not only on the growth of
output and the substitution of capital input for labor input, but also on the character of technical
change. We have emphasized the wide variations in rates of productivity growth among industries.
However, labor demand at the industry level is also strongly affected by biases of technical change.
We have focused attention in labor-saving and labor-using biases for each of the 35 industries in
IGEM. We have assessed the importance of these biases during the historical period 1960–2004
and projected the biases for 2004–2030. Part of the growth of labor input in industries like
Instruments, Tobacco, Coal Mining, and Communications will be due to ongoing labor-using
biases.
In summary, potential growth of the U.S. economy will be slowing considerably and mone-
tary policy will have to adapt to the new environment. The changes we have projected embody
many features of the future labor market that are well known to economists and monetary policy-
makers—slowing population growth, particularly for the working age population, and declining
growth in labor quality. We have quantified these factors by relying on official population pro-
jections for the Bureau of the Census and our own estimates of labor quality growth. This has
enabled us to characterize the future growth of labor supply with some precision.
The future growth of the U.S. economy depends on the contribution of labor input, that is,
the growth rate of labor input multiplied by the labor share of output. However, future growth
also depends on the rate of growth of total factor productivity and the contribution of capital
input. In the neo-classical theory of growth embodied in IGEM, the contribution of capital input,
the growth rate of capital input multiplied by the capital share, is endogenous. To a reasonable
approximation growth rates of output and capital input must converge in the long run. The only
component of the sources of growth not yet accounted for is productivity growth.
We have projected future productivity growth on the basis of the historical data on productivity
growth constructed by Jorgenson, Ho, Samuels, and Stiroh (2007). We have augmented this
description of future changes in technology at the level of individual industries by estimating and
projecting labor-saving and labor-using biases of technical change. This enables us to conclude
that future productivity growth during the next quarter century will be substantially less than
productivity growth during our historical period 1960–2004. This completes our analysis of labor
demand and its distribution by industry.
Economists and policy-makers, especially in the Federal Reserve System, have made impor-
tant contributions to our present understanding of the role of technology in the evolution of labor
demand and the growth of the U.S. economy.11 The remaining challenge will be to build the
new understanding of technology and the sources of economic growth into the framework for the
conduct of monetary policy. This new policy framework can be erected on the solid foundation
provided by projections of future demographic change. The new framework will be an impor-
tant addition to the Federal Reserve’s highly successful policy structure for understanding and
mitigating the impact of the business cycle.
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